Platform
Risk lives in the connection.
A vulnerability is one fact. An attack path explains what that fact allows an attacker to reach next.
- Developer
- GitHub
- Secret
- Cloud Account
- Production
Each hop validated by successful exploitation
An attacker does not see isolated findings.
Security products often produce separate findings because they inspect separate systems. An attacker sees opportunities that connect.
A public endpoint exposes a credential, that credential belongs to a developer identity with access to GitHub, and a repository there holds a secret that authenticates to a cloud account with reach into production.
Each step may belong to a different security product. The attacker only cares that the route works.
Four canonical paths
The same logic, across four surfaces
No single step needs to look catastrophic in isolation. The route is the risk.
Applications
- Internet
- Application
- Credential
- Internal Network
- Customer Data
An application weakness matters more once it produces a credential, that credential matters more once it works somewhere internal, and the internal foothold matters most when it reaches customer data.
SaaS & Identity
- Compromised Identity
- SaaS Platform
- Sensitive Customer Records
An account compromise becomes material when its permissions, grants or tokens expose sensitive records. The blast radius is defined by effective access, not by the username.
Developer access
- Developer
- GitHub
- Secret
- Cloud Account
- Production
Developer access becomes infrastructure access when source repositories contain secrets or integration credentials. The path connects identity, source, credentials, cloud access and production.
AI Systems
- Malicious Content
- AI Agent
- Tool Call
- Production Database
An AI issue becomes materially different when the system has authority to act. Content influences the model, the model influences a tool call, the tool reaches production data.
Prioritization
Attack paths change what you fix first.
Suppose two findings carry similar severity.
Finding A
Difficult to exploit, and it reaches an isolated system.
Finding B
Gives an ordinary user a credential that unlocks a sensitive SaaS application.
A flat severity score makes the two look similar, where attack-path context does not, and the question turns into: which finding changes what the attacker can reach?
Proof comes before path confidence.
A graph built from assumptions is not security proof.
A path becomes useful when its important steps are supported by adversarial evidence. That is why the platform leads with validated exploitation rather than with an impressive-looking diagram.
Availability
Platform vision vs automated chaining
The attack-path model is central to RedMaw, and the current availability boundary still matters.
Today RedMaw tests supported surfaces and preserves findings and evidence in a common state. The deeper automation that dynamically chains every step across all four surfaces is deeper still.
Reachability is how attackers think. RedMaw proves the hops it can prove.
From path to remediation
Attack-path context should survive into the fix.
A developer or security engineer should be able to understand not only what is broken, but why it matters and what it enables.
Once the relevant issue is remediated RedMaw re-tests it, and if the path is no longer viable the security state changes with it.
Stop assuming you are secure. Prove it.
Continuously test what an attacker can actually reach across your applications, SaaS identities, internal infrastructure and AI systems.