Platform
Proof, not probability.
A possible weakness becomes a validated finding only when adversarial testing proves it can produce a real security outcome.
Security teams do not have a findings problem. They have a certainty problem.
Most security programs are not short of things to look at. They are short of answers to five questions.
- Which findings are actually exploitable?
- Which ones create access to sensitive data?
- Which ones matter because they sit on a meaningful path?
- Which ones are duplicates of something already known?
- Which ones are really fixed?
A probability score can help with prioritization. It cannot answer these by itself. RedMaw treats validated evidence as the foundation of the finding.
Definition
What “validated” means
A validated finding should establish more than the presence of a weakness. Depending on the target and technique, the evidence shows:
- The affected asset, identity, model or endpoint
- The technique used
- The action that succeeded
- The privilege or boundary that was crossed
- The system or information that became reachable
- The sequence needed to reproduce the result
- The scope under which the test was authorized
The objective is to make the finding defensible to both the security team and the person who has to fix it.
Reproducibility is not a nice-to-have.
A finding that cannot be reproduced creates friction.
Engineering has to guess. Security has to retest manually. The conversation becomes whether the issue is real rather than how to fix it.
RedMaw preserves the technical context needed to make the attack repeatable within scope. That reduces the distance between discovery and remediation.
Session replay
Record the attack, not only the conclusion.
Session recording and replay provide a way to inspect how a finding was produced, particularly for complex findings where the sequence matters more than a single request or screenshot.
A security engineer can answer:
- What did RedMaw do?
- In what sequence?
- Which target responded?
- What access was achieved?
- Which assumption failed?
- What needs to change for the exploit to stop working?
Integrity
Signed and tamper-evident evidence
Where supported, RedMaw signs evidence so that it is tamper-evident. That matters when an organization needs to show not only what was found, but that the underlying record has not been silently modified since.
It is useful for internal review, security governance, customer assurance and compliance evidence workflows.
It is not a certification claim.
Common language
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
RedMaw maps relevant findings to MITRE ATT&CK, which gives security teams a shared technical vocabulary for the adversary behavior a finding represents.
The mapping is not the proof. The proof is the validated activity. MITRE provides the language around it.
Evidence should survive the handoff.
A common failure in vulnerability management is that the useful technical context gets lost the moment the issue becomes a ticket.
RedMaw is designed so the evidence follows the finding into:
- Jira
- GitHub Issues
- Slack
- Reports
- The built-in findings view
The person fixing the issue should receive the attack context, not only a severity label.
Proof is not a reporting feature. It is the closure condition.
After remediation, RedMaw runs the attack again. The retest creates the final proof state.
Closed by proof
Stop assuming you are secure. Prove it.
Continuously test what an attacker can actually reach across your applications, SaaS identities, internal infrastructure and AI systems.