See what a compromised identity can actually reach.

Organizations often respond to account compromise by resetting the password and forcing the user to authenticate again. That is necessary. It may not be sufficient.

An attacker may already hold:

Identity security is often treated as an administrative problem: users, groups, roles, MFA, provisioning. An attacker sees access relationships instead.

Which identity can reach which application? Which role can access which record? Which delegated application has broader access than expected? Which service account sits outside normal user controls? Which permission creates a route to sensitive customer information?

The point is not to grade configuration hygiene. It is to understand attacker reachability.

OAuth makes legitimate integrations possible, but delegated access can quietly become part of the persistence layer after a compromise. RedMaw examines customer-controlled OAuth and permission relationships for issues such as over-broad grants, unnecessary delegated permissions, third-party applications with sensitive access, and grants that remain useful after a password change.

A finding becomes more important when it can be tied to real data or system reachability.

RedMaw does not attack the SaaS provider. It tests the part you control: identities, roles, permissions, sharing settings, leaked keys, customer-managed configuration, delegated application access and sensitive-data reachability.

This boundary is deliberate. Your SaaS vendor secures its platform. You still own how your organization configures and uses it.

A file, folder, record, dashboard or workspace can be functioning exactly as designed and still be exposed more broadly than the organization intended.

The useful finding is not “sharing is enabled.” It is what becomes reachable because of it.

Human users are only part of the identity surface. API keys, service accounts, integration tokens and machine credentials may hold durable access to systems that are less visible in normal identity-review workflows.

A leaked credential matters when it works. Within approved scope, RedMaw validates credential exposure and connects it to the resources the credential can access.

Validated findings enter the RedMaw findings-state layer. They can be pushed to Jira, GitHub Issues, Slack or email with proof and remediation guidance attached.

After the fix, RedMaw re-tests the issue. The finding closes when the exploit no longer works.